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Kosovo: 
Independence and tutelage
Oisín Tansey
Oisín Tansey is a lecturer in the Department of Politics and Interna-
tional Relations at the University of Reading in the United Kingdom. 
He is the author of Regime Building: Democratization and Internation-
al Administration (2009).
Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 represented 
a milestone in the turbulent politics of the Balkans and began a new phase 
in the history of the long disputed Kosovo territory. Once a province 
within Yugoslavia and long claimed by Serbia, Kosovo asserted full 
sovereignty and declared itself “a democratic, secular and multiethnic 
republic.” Combined with the introduction of a new constitution, the move 
quickly won support from a wide range of states, including the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and their fellow G7 members. Kosovo’s 
claims to democratic status were also backed by its record of political 
development since 1999. This has included the establishment of a range 
of democratic political institutions (including the elected, 120-member 
Assembly of Kosovo that issued the independence declaration) operat-
ing within a context of regular, free, and fair elections that have led to 
peaceful turnovers of power.
Yet Kosovo’s political status remains unclear, and its progress uncer-
tain. It is too soon to call this territory of about 11,000 square kilometers 
and two million people either a securely sovereign state or a full-fledged 
democracy. Most of the world’s governments have yet to endorse Kos-
ovo’s declaration, while Serbia and Russia have led the way in opposing it. 
The European Union remains divided. Several prominent EU members, led 
by Spain, have avowed their opposition to Kosovar statehood. Kosovo’s 
democratic project also labors under difficult challenges. Since NATO 
intervened to force the withdrawal of Serbian troops in 1999, political 
development has been overseen by the United Nations Interim Administra-
tion Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Working with domestic actors, UNMIK 
has helped to lay the groundwork for institutions, standards, and practices 
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that are consistent with democracy. Yet while there has been significant 
progress, things have not always gone smoothly, and Kosovo continues 
to grapple with the complex problem of how to make liberal democracy 
a reality in a postconflict society divided between an Albanian majority 
and a Serb minority. Institutions remain weak, the rule of law is fragile, 
and most of the ethnic-Serb populace (estimated to constitute between 
5 and 10 percent of all Kosovo’s residents) has refused to participate in 
the new regime, regarding Belgrade as the rightful seat of government. 
Although UNMIK has been winding down, it retains a significant role 
and in 2008 was joined by two new international missions, an EU rule-
of-law mission and an International Civilian Representative who would 
oversee further political reform and also act as the European Union’s 
Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo. 
The task of achieving stability and democracy in Kosovo thus remains 
complex, with many challenges, multiple actors whose roles can overlap, 
and no consensus among Kosovo’s communities regarding the direction 
that change should take. Nearly a decade of international governance has 
provided Kosovo with the core structures of a democratic regime, but 
continuing domestic problems and sustained international intervention 
limit the scope for genuine democratic governance. Kosovo must over-
come a formidable array of internal social and political problems while 
also gaining full independence from international oversight before it can 
fully achieve healthy democratic rule. 
Given the decades of intercommunal division in the territory, meet-
ing these challenges will not be easy. Kosovo’s recent political history 
revolves around one issue more than any other: political status. Serbia 
claims Kosovo as part of its own territory even though ethnic-Albanian 
Kosovars, who make up nine-tenths of the populace, have always resisted 
rule from Belgrade. Yugoslavia’s communist strongman Josip Broz Tito 
(d. 1980) treated Kosovo as an autonomous province. When Slobodan 
Miloševiæ (d. 2006) became Serbia’s president in 1989, he revoked this 
status and sought to reassert Serb authority. In response, the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK) formed under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova 
in order to spearhead a nonviolent campaign for independence. The LDK 
made little headway, however, and in 1996 a new paramilitary group, the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), began attacking Serbian troops within 
Kosovo. Full-scale conflict broke out in 1998, and Serbian forces deployed 
in Kosovo not only engaged the KLA but also inflicted heavy civilian 
casualties in Albanian areas, leading to significant refugee flows. 
Serbia’s actions drew broad international condemnation, and after ef-
forts to broker a ceasefire failed to win Belgrade’s assent, NATO began 
a high-altitude bombing campaign in March 1999 to force Serbia out of 
Kosovo. The air war went on for 78 days, until Belgrade agreed to pull 
out all Serbian forces (paramilitary and police as well as military) and 
to allow an international presence, both civil and military, in Kosovo. 
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Consequently, on June 10 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
1244, which set up UNMIK and gave full executive and legislative author-
ity in Kosovo to the mission head, the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General (SRSG). To complement UNMIK, an armed NATO 
force (KFOR) went in to oversee the withdrawal of Serbian forces and 
provide security for the populace and the international presence. 
The international mission had a broad range of goals, including not 
only such security basics as troop withdrawal and demilitarization, but 
also explicitly political responsibilities. In particular, while the question 
of Kosovo’s final status was essentially frozen, UNMIK was mandated to 
promote “the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government” 
by holding elections and overseeing the development of new institu-
tions of “democratic and autonomous self-government.” As a result, the 
international mission would take the lead in guiding Kosovo’s political 
development, working alongside local actors but often acting unilaterally 
when officials deemed it necessary. At the local level, UNMIK had to 
deal not only with the LDK, but also a growing number of new political 
parties. In particular, two successor parties to the disbanded KLA made 
a significant political impact. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) 
was formed in the immediate aftermath of the conflict by senior KLA 
leader Hashim Thaçi, while in May 2000 a second party was created when 
a former KLA commander, Ramush Haradinaj, established the Alliance 
for the Future of Kosovo (AAK).
Building a Democratic Regime 
The international administration mission established in Kosovo in 
1999 was not unique: The UN dispatched a similar mission to East Timor 
(now Timor-Leste) as it emerged from Indonesian occupation that same 
year, and there is a long history of international governance in weakly 
governed or disputed territories. In recent years, large international ad-
ministration missions have tended to share a range of goals, including the 
establishment of peace and security, the strengthening of the rule of law, 
and economic reconstruction. Additionally, democratization has been a 
common objective of international actors, and periods of international 
administration thus often become periods of attempted regime change as 
well, with international administrators pursuing a policy of “democratic-
regime building.”
These regime-building efforts go beyond conventional democracy pro-
motion, for they give international actors broad executive authority and 
political roles usually held by locals. International administrators often 
wield powers that are normally beyond the reach of external actors, and 
thus become key players in the process of regime change. For example, 
international authorities can set the conditions for their own withdrawal, 
and in so doing can place specific boundaries on the domestic political 
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agenda. Administrators can also veto actions by local politicians and 
impose other measures instead. The issues involved may be relatively 
technical, but can also affect matters as far-reaching as the design of 
basic political institutions.
Yet international efforts do not easily translate into significant demo-
cratic development on the ground, not least because these efforts are 
usually made where states have failed or 
been gravely weakened, often in the wake 
of an armed conflict. While the presence 
of international administrators may block 
the most undemocratic outcomes and help 
to ensure that the structures of a demo-
cratic regime are established, these out-
side actors cannot themselves guarantee 
that a democratic transition will succeed 
or be sustained. International governance 
itself has risks and drawbacks: Rule by 
unelected foreign figures may breed 
resentment or dependency (or both). 
Successful transition ultimately requires 
committed local elites and favorable domestic structures that interna-
tional actors cannot simply will into being. Kosovo’s recent experience 
highlights many of the promises and limits of the international approach. 
Years of international intervention there have helped Kosovo to achieve 
significant democratic development, but at the same time it can by no 
stretch be called a robust and sustainable democracy.
Nonetheless, the UN mission has had a profound impact on politics 
in Kosovo. UNMIK played a central role in political development after 
1999, and in many ways the international administrators can be seen as 
coauthors of the regime transition that has taken place in subsequent 
years. Over the past decade, the UN mission has created institutions 
of local governance, overseen a series of elections, and done much to 
determine the political agenda and set the pace and direction of political 
development. Early on, UNMIK sought full control and created nothing 
but limited, interim local institutions. The only consultative forum, the 
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), had a membership appointed by 
UNMIK and few powers of its own. In response to the resulting criti-
cism from leading Kosovars, UNMIK in late 1999 created a Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure. This more closely resembled a conventional 
government, boasting twenty administrative departments and a new ex-
ecutive body, the Interim Administrative Council (IAC). Nonetheless, 
authority in all areas of political life in Kosovo still lay unequivocally 
with the UN’s special representative, and while the KTC and the IAC 
could make recommendations and suggest policy, in practice much of 
the initiative still rested with UNMIK officials. 
International efforts 
do not easily translate 
into significant demo-
cratic development on 
the ground, not least 
because these efforts 
are usually made where 
states have failed or 
been gravely weakened.
157Oisín Tansey
Growing dissatisfaction led to greater devolution of power in 2001, 
when international and domestic officials held negotiations over a more 
permanent and authoritative set of domestic political institutions. The 
leading politicians from Kosovo’s Albanian community wanted a full 
constitution. Yet international concerns that this might prejudge the 
resolution of Kosovo’s controversial political status meant that the ne-
gotiations would be allowed to lead only to a “constitutional framework” 
rather than a full-fledged constitution. This framework featured a directly 
elected unicameral assembly and an indirectly elected one-person presi-
dency. The talks fell short of full consensus, however, and several senior 
Kosovar politicians refused to endorse the final package. 
Several points remained in dispute. Among them were the questions of 
a timetable for UN withdrawal (there was none) and the absence of any 
provision for an independence referendum, as well as UNMIK’s insist-
ence on retaining full and exclusive control over external relations and 
matters of law and order. Highlighting the international administrators’ 
remarkable power to impose key political outcomes, the SRSG (at that 
time the post was held by a former Danish cabinet minister named Hans 
Hakkerup) signed the framework into law on 15 May 2001. A similar 
process had been playing out in the electoral arena as well: When Kosovo’s 
parties could not agree on election rules in 2000 and 2001, international 
preferences ruled instead, deciding all open questions. Thus the inter-
national mission introduced its preferred electoral rules—calling for a 
proportional-representation (PR) system based on open lists—despite a 
lack of consensus among locals. As with the constitutional framework, the 
absence of full domestic consensus had been set aside, and international 
officials made the key decisions.1
Once the new Provisional Institutions of Self-Government were in 
place, they paved the way for the first Kosovo-wide elections in October 
2001 (municipal elections had been held in 2000). Rugova’s LDK won 45 
percent of the vote and joined the PDK and AAK in a grand coalition of 
Kosovo Albanian parties for a three-year term in office. The results were 
also notable for the strong showing of the Kosovo Serb grouping known 
as Coalition Return (named after its central goal of securing the return 
of all Serbs displaced from Kosovo after the 1999 NATO campaign), 
which polled 11.3 percent of the vote. These elections have since been 
followed by two further sets of Kosovo-wide elections that have led to 
two new governments. The first alternation in power took place after the 
2004 elections, when the LDK and AAK gained enough seats to take 
power without the PDK. Although the PDK was unhappy to be shut out 
and international authorities pressed to save the grand coalition, the LDK 
and the AAK forged ahead and formed the government by themselves. 
The ethnic-Serb population boycotted the voting this time, as it would 
again in the third Kosovo-wide poll, held in 2007. 
This most recent balloting for the Assembly of Kosovo shook up the 
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party system just months before independence was declared. The LDK, 
suffering its first electoral setback, found that it was no longer Kosovo’s 
largest party. Ibrahim Rugova had died while serving as Kosovo’s presi-
dent in 2006, and both his loss and the struggle over who would succeed 
him as party leader had hurt the LDK badly. From a 2001 highwater mark 
of just under 360,000 votes, its vote total had shrunk below 130,000. Its 
vote share, meanwhile, had more than halved between 2004 and 2007, 
plummeting from 45.4 percent in the former year to 22.6 percent in the 
latter.2 By contrast, the PDK increased its vote from 28.9 percent to 34.3 
percent over the same period to become Kosovo’s largest party.3 In the 
wake of the elections, the PDK led the way in coalition talks. Despite 
their former rivalry, the two parties agreed to form a new government 
with former KLA leader Hashim Thaçi as the new PDK premier and the 
LDK incumbent, Fatmir Sejdiu, continuing as president. 
Since 2001, Kosovo’s own elected officials have been “cohabiting” 
with international administrators. In general, this relationship has worked 
well, and neither side has sought seriously to undermine the other. Yet 
tensions have persisted as locals and internationals have at times pursued 
separate agendas. In the Kosovo Assembly’s early days, it often clashed 
with UNMIK officials over the limits to its powers. On several occasions 
the UN special representative declared an Assembly resolution “null 
and void,” and when the Assembly in 2003 and 2004 tried unilaterally 
to amend the constitutional framework, UNMIK rejected the proposed 
changes.4
UNMIK also frustrated domestic actors by seeking to control the politi-
cal agenda, most notably through its policy of “standards before status.” 
This strategy, introduced in 2002, linked the resolution of Kosovo’s 
political status to progress toward meeting a series of internationally 
specified benchmarks that included functioning democratic institutions, 
the rule of law, freedom of movement, and the return and reintegration of 
refugees and displaced persons. In November 2003, UNMIK announced 
that sufficient progress on standards could lead to the opening of political-
status talks after mid-2005. As a result, the standards process dominated 
Kosovo’s political life until the status talks began in early 2006, and 
political development was geared to meeting UNMIK’s specifications. 
Despite Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, UNMIK con-
tinues to report on progress toward meeting key benchmarks, and the 
standards process remains a major feature of politics. In 2006, the UN 
standards were folded into an EU Partnership Action Plan for Kosovo 
that sets out a series of reform targets and entails annual EU compliance 
reports.5 Through all this, the standards process has not lacked for crit-
ics. Detractors charge that its targets are unreasonable, and blame it for 
causing what they see as destabilizing delays in the settling of the status 
issue—delays whose most serious consequence so far has been the wave 
of anti-Serb violence that broke out in March 2004. Moreover, critics 
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complain, the standards are thinly rooted, with progress coming mainly in 
the form of laws crafted (with much international help) to meet technical 
requirements, but with too little in the way of home-grown support from 
voters or follow-through by Kosovo’s executive branch.
The Road to Independence 
Although the standards process was controversial and locals never 
fully embraced it, in 2005 the UN decided to start talks on Kosovo’s 
political status. The UN review leading to this decision highlighted many 
areas that needed work, especially in the realm of protecting minority 
rights, but acknowledged that putting off the status question had led 
to widespread frustration, and suggested that continued postponement 
would lead to greater instability.6 As a result, the status talks began in 
early 2006, before all the standards had been fully met. The UN special 
envoy, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, oversaw months of 
shuttle diplomacy between Priština and Belgrade as well as face-to-face 
negotiations between Kosovo Albanian and Serb officials. 
Yet there proved to be little room for compromise between the mutu-
ally exclusive options to which each side firmly held: full independence 
for Kosovo or substantial autonomy within Serbia. The talks ended in 
deadlock. Ahtisaari’s report urged the UN to resolve the status issue 
unilaterally, and recommended for Kosovo “independence, supervised 
by the international community.”7 His plan included extensive provisions 
for the protection of Serb minorities in an independent Kosovo, including 
a process of decentralization and redistricting meant to ensure that most 
Serbs would live in majority-Serb municipalities. Crucially, the plan also 
proposed that UNMIK should disband, with the EU stepping in to take 
the lead.8 Serbia and Russia vehemently opposed Ahtisaari’s ideas, and 
Moscow used a veto threat in the UN Security Council to ensure that no 
resolution authorizing the new international mission to Kosovo would 
gain approval. In August, a new round of internationally mediated talks 
commenced with a UN-set deadline of 10 December 2007, but again they 
failed to lead to any agreement between the sides. 
In the face of this impasse, Kosovo drew tacit support from Wash-
ington and several European donors for its February 2008 independence 
declaration.9 In the declaration itself, the Assembly of Kosovo pledges 
to implement Ahtisaari’s plan in full. Accordingly, among newly inde-
pendent Kosovo’s first acts was acceptance of an EU rule-of-law mission 
(known as EULEX) to provide support and oversight in the security and 
judicial sectors, and an International Civilian Representative who would 
oversee implementation of the Ahtisaari plan and act as the EU’s Special 
Representative in Kosovo. Both EULEX and the special representative 
possess a range of executive powers, though in neither case do these reach 
the level of authority that UNMIK and its chief enjoyed.
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As these developments have unfolded, Belgrade and Moscow have 
continued their campaign against independence or anything that might 
assist its realization. Russia has heavily lobbied the UN to keep UNMIK 
in Kosovo, and the smooth transition from UN to EU leadership envis-
aged in the Ahtisaari Plan failed to materialize. Tensions between the 
international missions mounted, and it was only after a November 2008 
agreement to “reconfigure” the international presence that EULEX was 
able to deploy its staff, albeit under a status-neutral “UN umbrella.” Thus 
have the events of 2008, coming after almost a decade of international 
governance in Kosovo, made it clear that international authorities will 
be staying for years to come. While many of the objectives of the initial 
intervention have long been achieved, concerns remain about security, 
the rule of law, and the protection of minorities. 
Kosovo’s Democratic Quality 
Democracy at its most basic requires free, fair, and competitive elections; 
full adult suffrage; a wide range of political freedoms; and government 
autonomy from outside influence. Leonardo Morlino further defines a good 
democracy as “a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and 
equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its 
institutions and mechanisms.” Such a regime, he explains, must constitute 
a legitimized political system that satisfies its citizens, provides liberty 
and equality, and permits the public to evaluate how the government is 
performing and to hold it to account.10 By these yardsticks, Kosovo’s newly 
declared state has achieved much. Yet it still falls far short of the democratic 
ideal and displays features which suggest that it will take some time before 
Kosovo can be described as a robust or “good” democracy. 
The achievements made under UNMIK’s auspices have been consid-
erable. Beginning in 2000, full adult suffrage was granted in a series of 
free and fair elections at both the local and Kosovo-wide levels. There is 
real multiparty competition: Three sets of central elections have led to 
alternations in power among three separate governing coalitions. Despite 
the postconflict setting, radical ultranationalist parties have a combined 
vote share that has never risen above a minuscule 2 percent. The leaders 
of all the major parties generally express moderate views on intercom-
munal relations and frequently stress that Kosovo is a multiethnic society 
in which the Serb minority has an important place. Senior Kosovo Al-
banian politicians have visited Serb-majority enclaves in efforts to build 
confidence in the Priština government. 
The need to promote minorities’ participation and guard their rights 
has received serious attention. The 2008 Constitution sets aside a sixth 
of the 120 seats in the Assembly for minorities (ten seats for Serbs and 
ten for non-Serbs), and requires as well that two of the Assembly’s five 
deputy-presidents be from minority groups. Proposed laws affecting such 
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“vital interests” as language, education, and communal symbols must win 
concurrent majorities in order to pass: Not only must a majority of the As-
sembly as a whole vote in favor, but so must a majority of those legislators 
who represent the minority communities. Repeal of any law in these areas 
likewise requires concurrent-majority consent. Cabinet posts are set aside 
too, with at least one Serb and one non-Serb minority minister constitution-
ally required. Similar forms of guaranteed minority representation obtain in 
the courts and local governing bodies. In addition, no constitutional change 
can pass unless two-thirds of the Assembly votes for it, and that two-thirds 
must include two-thirds of the minority-community representatives. 
Kosovo has vibrant independent media, and civil society is gaining 
strength and beginning to exert greater influence on government. Kos-
ovo has also been more proactive in cooperating with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) than some of its 
Balkan neighbors. In 2005, the ICTY indicted AAK leader Ramush Ha-
radinaj, who was then serving as prime minister, for crimes committed 
against Serbs while he was a KLA commander. Haradinaj immediately 
resigned, publicly urged calm, and surrendered peacefully to the Hague 
authorities. He was released pending the full trial, and his cooperation 
with authorities won him permission to resume a role in politics. In March 
2008, the ICTY acquitted him for lack of evidence.11 The Tribunal’s rul-
ing, however, stated that there had been problems in getting witnesses to 
testify, and prosecutors began lodging appeals. Citing the unstable security 
situation in Kosovo, the judges contended that the trial had been held in 
an atmosphere which made witnesses feel unsafe. 
As the events around the Haradinaj trial suggest, Kosovo remains a 
deeply divided society with serious intercommunal problems. While the 
structures of democracy have been established, and many of its practices 
entrenched, key features associated with genuine democratic rule are 
missing. The conflict’s most damaging legacy is the almost total social 
and political segregation of the Albanian and Serb communities. The 
party system contains only parties that represent one ethnic community or 
the other; no party spans the communal divide. The Serb community has 
boycotted Kosovo’s political institutions and every election except for the 
2001 Assembly balloting. A sense that the government is legitimate—a 
central ingredient of democratic quality—is missing among Kosovo’s Serb 
population. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have written about the damage 
that such problems of “stateness” can do to efforts at democratic transi-
tion and consolidation. Kosovo clearly exhibits the key stateness-related 
obstacles that they identify: fundamental societal differences over both the 
boundaries of the territorial political entity (the polity) and the identity 
of those belonging to the political community (the demos).12
To go with their boycott, Kosovo’s Serbs have established parallel 
political structures in those parts of Kosovo (mostly in the north) where 
Serbs predominate. The Serbian government funds these structures, and 
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Belgrade pressures Kosovo Serbs to use and staff the parallel institu-
tions rather than anything sponsored by Priština. The Serbian-backed 
structures include Serbian police in northern Kosovo, separate Serb-run 
courts, and health-care and educational facilities funded directly by the 
Serbian state.13 Kosovo’s decision to declare independence sparked a 
strengthening of these institutions, which in June 2008 were joined by 
an unofficial Kosovo Serb Assembly that meets within the Serb enclave 
in Mitrovica, a divided town in northern Kosovo.
The geographical and social separation of Kosovo’s Serb and Albanian 
populations is also stark. In addition to the large concentration of Serbs 
in the north, there are isolated Serb enclaves across the south. Freedom 
of movement remains a problem, and some Serbs, especially in the south, 
limit their travels around Kosovo. Illegal occupation of Serb-owned 
houses by Kosovo Albanians is a practice that, despite recent govern-
ment legislation, local Albanian leaders too often facilitate. An estimated 
150,000 Serbs fled Kosovo after Serbian forces withdrew in mid-1999, 
and Albanians turned on Serbs in a widespread pattern of revenge vio-
lence. The UN estimates that since 2000, only 17,000 displaced members 
of minority groups have returned to Kosovo, with unresolved property 
disputes and security concerns remaining key factors.14
Large-scale intercommunal violence has been rare, but a wave of anti-
Serb attacks in March 2004 has left lingering fear and bitterness. Rumors 
that Serb intimidation had led to the drowning of three Kosovo Albanian 
children sparked two days of large-scale riots and coordinated attacks 
on Serb areas throughout Kosovo. Nineteen people were killed, nearly 
a thousand injured, and more than four-thousand Serbs displaced.15 The 
riots highlighted the fragility of the security situation at the time, and the 
slack police and judicial response to them raised doubts about the rule 
of law. Police officers and prosecutors often lodged charges that failed 
to correspond with the severity of the crimes, and judges handed down 
excessively lenient sentences. Witnesses, whether Serbs terrified of repris-
als or Albanians sympathetic to the accused, often refused to testify. The 
OSCE has noted that more than 50,000 people (including many members 
of the Kosovo Police Service) are thought to have taken part in the vio-
lence, but as of 2008 only about 400 persons had faced prosecution, with 
around three-quarters convicted.16 Since 2004, violence has become rarer, 
although a protest against independence in a Serb enclave did lead to the 
death of an UNMIK police officer in 2008. 
Continuing worries about whether law rules Kosovo have led to inter-
national jurists staying on to run courts deep into the postconflict period. 
Corruption is also a major problem and undermines efforts to develop the 
rule of law throughout the political system. Handing out official posts on 
the basis of personal or political ties remains a common practice. Transpar-
ency International’s Global Corruption Barometer recently listed Kosovo 
as one of the ten countries in the world most affected by bribery.
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Aside from domestic challenges, Kosovo’s democracy is also depend-
ent on international forces that are beyond its control. Whatever Kosovo 
Albanians may wish, Belgrade remains a major player in Kosovo’s 
politics, and Serbian policies will be influencing the political agenda in 
Priština for some time to come. Although the Serbian government that 
came to power in 2008 is pro-European and less vociferously nationalist 
than previous administrations,17 it nonetheless insists (like all Serbian 
governments before it) that Kosovo is part of Serbia. President Boris Tadiæ 
and Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkoviæ both have committed themselves 
to this line and have signaled their support for the parallel institutions in 
northern Kosovo, including the Mitrovica-based assembly. 
Crucially, Kosovo also remains subject to administration by inter-
national authorities. UNMIK has carved out a new role in the post-
independence period and now coexists with the two newer EU entities. 
The former now exerts a fraction of the authority that it once did, and 
to date the EU offices have refrained from any intrusive use of their 
executive powers. Nonetheless, the international missions retain rights 
to extensive legislative and executive authority, and Kosovo’s elected 
government thus coexists with centers of power that are closed to the 
channels of representation and accountability normally present in a 
democracy. Tension between UNMIK and the newer entities over their 
relative powers and duties is further frustrating the democratic prospect 
in Kosovo. It is no small challenge for Kosovo’s government to assert 
due autonomy and democratic legitimacy in this context of continued 
international involvement in what, under normal circumstances, would 
be its own domestic affairs. 
Conditional Independence, Conditional Democracy 
Hopes for democracy in Kosovo depend on two things: the attainment 
of political independence from external administrators and further politi-
cal progress at the domestic level. While much has been achieved since 
1999, the experience of democratic regime-building has been far from 
an unqualified success, and UNMIK’s record in promoting democratic 
development in Kosovo has been mixed. 
To a large extent, the presence of UNMIK after 1999 helped to reduce 
uncertainty during the transition phase and ensured that the transition 
favored democratic development rather than authoritarian retrenchment. 
The UN mission also successfully established domestic institutions of 
self-government and administered a series of free and fair democratic 
elections. Yet the course of political development in Kosovo has not run 
smooth, and the transition since 1999 has been marked by significant 
instances of international imposition as well as international and domestic 
cooperation. UNMIK used conditionality extensively, making both its own 
withdrawal and talks on Kosovo’s status contingent on progress toward 
164 Journal of Democracy
a set of internationally specified benchmarks, with special reference to 
minority protection. This resulted in an extensive institutional and leg-
islative framework supporting Kosovo’s minority communities, but one 
that has not been accompanied by similar 
levels of government implementation or 
commitment at the local level. 
Issues of minority rights continue to 
be a concern, with limitations on free-
dom of movement and perceptions of 
insecurity restricting political space for 
the Serb minority. The sustained Serb 
political boycott and the continued ex-
istence of parallel Serb-run institutions 
further suggest a profound rejection of 
the legitimacy of the Kosovo govern-
ment within the Serb community, raising 
serious questions about the viability of a 
multiethnic democracy within a unified 
Kosovo. Kosovo’s institutions remain 
weak, and the institutional structures of government and administra-
tion remain unable, and at times unwilling, to maintain the rule of law 
throughout the territory, not least by ensuring that all members of the 
political community are treated equally and have equal access to the legal 
and political system. 
International authorities have had extensive responsibilities in these 
areas, and the continuing problems partly reflect the limits of demo-
cratic regime-building in postconflict settings. Yet not only international 
failures, but the views and policies of domestic actors, have frustrated 
progress. Consequently, while a reformed international presence in Ko-
sovo may facilitate future improvements, significant forward movement 
will not come without the cooperation and commitment of Kosovo’s 
divided political communities. 
The months since independence was declared have brought both prom-
ising and troubling signs. Kosovo’s government has sought to promote 
the newly declared state as an inclusive and multiethnic one, and the 
new constitution makes permanent a wide range of minority protections 
originally introduced under UN auspices. But the declaration itself in-
flamed the Serb community, whose angry reaction ruled out any prospect 
of a smooth transition to a stable, multiethnic, and unified Kosovo state. 
The Kosovo authorities have in turn refused to renew negotiations with 
Belgrade on a number of issues of mutual interest, including police and 
judicial arrangements, that the UN wants to see settled. 
Furthermore, the continued oversight exercised by outside powers 
unavoidably takes a toll on the democratic quality of domestic institu-
tions. UNMIK’s current role in Kosovo is a shadow of what it once was, 
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and many of the powers that it assumed in 1999 now belong to domestic 
authorities. In September 2007, the UN secretary-general stated that UN-
MIK had largely achieved what it could. Kosovo’s subsequent declaration 
of independence and the arrival of the EU missions further suggested that 
UNMIK’s days were numbered.18 Yet the tangled international diplomacy 
surrounding Kosovo’s political status has meant that the UN has contin-
ued to play a significant role in domestic affairs. Russian insistence on 
adherence to UNMIK’s founding Resolution 1244, which acknowledges 
the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslavia (now taken effectively 
to mean Serbia), requires Kosovo to host three separate and uneasily 
coexisting international offices, each of which enjoys some form of 
executive authority even as it lacks the capacity for representation and 
accountability that is a crucial aspect of democratic relations between 
governors and those whom they govern. 
In a fully independent Kosovo, with proper domestic institutions in 
place and in charge, the potential for genuinely democratic self-rule 
will be considerable. Yet even then, domestic institutions and domestic 
actors will have to conquer stubborn challenges if Kosovo is to develop 
a stable and sustainable democratic political system. Democratic regime-
building “from outside” has contributed to Kosovo’s progress to date, 
but its contribution is inherently limited. Successful democratization 
requires domestic rather than international commitment, and Kosovo’s 
long-term prospects will thus only be known once international ad-
ministrators withdraw and Kosovo’s Serb and Albanian communities 
are given the opportunity to decide their own collective fate. Although 
Kosovo now has many of the political structures necessary to achieve 
democracy in a plural society, the profound gulf between the Serb and 
Albanian populations means that sustainable political accommodation 
remains a distant goal.
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